59

Maybe it is very significant that analytic philosophy has a traditional consensus that words have meaning, not things.

An analytic philosopher is so used to the praxis of this consensus that this may sound like a bizarre attack on a notion that is trivially correct. But isn’t this actually a pre-supposition that’s both obviously contingent/questionable & vastly impactful/consequential? (& indeed ideological, begging much explanation?)

  • furthermore, words are taken as having (primarily or only) extensional meaning, which can be regarded as disconnecting/removing meaning from individual minds/persons…

so: Therefore, naturally focusing on that which seems most meaningful – and specifically words being that -, the focus of the analytic methodology and tradition in general is on words! – And this focus and prioritisation in turn(, especially considered beyond the limited aspects/interests of philosophical enquiry,) gives words[, in principal and in general,] authority and power.

or, more simply: The rational mind sees words as the locus of meaning, therefore focuses on words, thereby endowing them with power… Rational traditions supports the power of the words, and more specifically commands and law-utterances, of authorities. I.e. such traditions support [power-]hierarchy.

  • So, this seems to fit perfectly with the law & order of [the lord] god & [church] hierarchy – & theology?

– Both the things [esp. nature] & the common/lay people have no [inherent] meaning – & should thus submit under the law/order of the word, the word that is authority and power due to carrying/holding meaning, indeed the totalised, objective meaning of the god-perspective – whether explicitly or implicitly – whether administered by a monk or a philosopher…

p.s. just as a reminder for contrast: The alternative is to consider it generally reasonable and possible that things have meaning – natural entities, phenomena, people, etc. – whilst words are just compromising, abstracting tools of communication between minds and meanings. (And of course, why not also that things are meaning? – An absurd notion in our reality, but really not absurd at all.)

58

Are contradictions in things or between things?

 

Is an event nothing but the realisation of a contradiction,

its consequences developing in logical progression as a process in time?

 

or is every process, and thus every sum of processes or things, naturally free of any internal contradiction?

Is contradiction only to be found at the distinction and boundary between two things,

thus any and every two things, thus every individual and every part and every aspect? – Cartesian Atomism?