dualism – A philosopher's notes and thoughts

44

[Standard] Rational realism says that the subjective/mental depends on the objective/material and not vice versa: the objective/material is independent of the subject/mental. This note explores the implications of a whole society/culture assuming this kind of realism.

Consider that in a hierarchically structured society/economy/state/system* one’s ability to determine/manipulate/change the objective/intersubjective/material/practical level [of reality] depends on one’s position in hierarchy – on the degree to which one has wealth/resources/influence/standing/privilege/power…

And so, for the lower levels of the hierarchical system, given that this form of realism says that they cannot improve their position by means of their own subjectivity/mental, namely that they cannot collectively imagine and re-configure reality, the ruled/lower classes/levels must believe/feel that, for them, the overall hierarchical structure/system is fixed, an unchangeable objective fact – that they are powerless to change it. …So rational realism/reality is perfectly suited to reify and support a hierarchy.

Just to re-iterate:

We have personal and communal imagination, ideals, goals. These belong to the subjective realm in the dualistic categorization of rational realism. According to this realism, the subjective realm is determined by the objective realm and not vice versa (which follows from the notion that the objective realm is independent of the subjective). Therefore, if we want to realise/materialize our imagination, we must do this indirectly through the objective realm: we must accrue resources/abilities in the objective/material realm with which we can then change things in accordance to our imagination. …And, in turn, that can only be done by functioning and attaining success in the currently institutionalised systems of material resources/abilities** – and these systems may be hierarchical. And without doing so, we cannot change institutionalized systems, as these belong to the objective realm.

It tricks us into thinking that in order to change the system we need to be granted power by the system.

* or a power-hierarchy, a hierarchically organized complex/network/tradition of wealth/influence/institutional status, etc.

By ‘hierarchy’ I largely mean multi-level systems such, that higher levels can control/exploit/influence lower levels (and not vice versa, at least not to the same degree) – with that system being sanctified by its ideology.

** Which means [unconsciously] adapting one’s character/beliefs to fit that specific reality and the mechanisms of the objects of that reality, namely things like money, dominance, status, exploitation, power, privilege…

entry 37

Das Problem der Verbindung von Bewusstsein und materieller Welt wird nur dann besser beschreibbar sein, wenn wir zunächst einmal sowohl von einem vorgegebenen Konzept des Bewusstseins wie auch von einem vorgegebenen Konzept einer materiellen Welt absehen. Wir werden nur dann fortschreiten können, wenn wir uns zunächst von den Prämissen der [modernen] Welt trennen. Später wird sich dann zeigen, dass die alltäglichen Konzepte nicht verloren gehen, sondern nur suspendiert werden mussten, um einen neuen Ansatz zu ermöglichen. Unter veränderten Rahmenbedingungen können sie dann wieder eingeführt werden und unter veränderten Interpretationsbidungen erneut zur Geltung kommen.

– eine Art philosophisches Manifesto, frei zitiert von Frank Vogelsang: Offene Wirklichkeit (2012) s.105

entry 36

two kinds of dualism: a second attempt at adequately expressing the distinction that I attempted to express in entry 25.

The first kind of dualism is a conceptual distinction: it simply says that if something exists, it is either material or mental and not both – and that these two categories are valid/adequate/complete.

The second kind of dualism is a statement of existence of things from both categories of the aforementioned distinction, so of [some] things that are mental and of [some]things that are material. In other words that some of the things that exist/are real are material and others are mental – that both categories are non-empty, thus of course also implying the validity/adequacy of the two concepts.

I want to make it clear that these are two very different statements, made on different levels.

The first kind of dualism is an idea about two ontological concepts as concepts. So, one could say, an idea about cosmology/ontology, a position in meta-cosmology, and in philosophical ontology.

While the second kind of dualism is an idea about entities/objects – a statement that uses two [pre-existing] ontological concepts as predicates/categories to state the existence/reality of certain sets of entities. So one could say the second kind of dualism is a position in cosmology or maybe in applied ontology: it is a determination made about the entities found in the language/culture of that thinker’s environment/tradition. Namely, it is the determination that some of the things of the thinker’s world that exist are material/non-mental, while other things of the thinker’s world that exist are non-material, mental.

Again, in the first meaning, dualism is a general statement made on the philosophical level, about all concepts, regardless of their domain of reference, especially regardless of whether their extension is non-empty. So, in this meaning, the distinction between dualist and non-dualist or monist is made in a philosophical/thought situation where neither the existence and non-existence of any entities is assumed, nor a particular [meta-]categorization of concepts into those for mental, non-material entities and those for material, non-mental entities. Here, dualism is itself a [meta]-categorization/taxonomy of ontological concepts – it takes all ontological concepts and places each in one of the two categories. This is philosophy.

In the second meaning, dualism is a general statement made about entities that one takes to exist/be real, i.e. the universe or reality: that the entities that exist/make up reality fall into two distinct, fundamental categories, so that some of the entities that exist/are real are non-conscious, non-mental, and extended and others of the entities that exist/are real have the opposite set of properties, namely they are non-material, mental entities. It is doubtful whether this is philosophy.

Now, it should be clear that the second kind of dualism implies/pre-supposes the first, while the inverse is not the case. Significantly, one can hold dualism of the first kind while rejecting dualism of the second kind. (!) For example, one can be a dualist of the first kind [, accepting the material-mental categorization, ] and be a materialist, meaning that all the things one sees as existing/being real fall into the material category. In fact, this is normal for materialism: it is one of the options within a dualist conceptual framework – it is a dualist ontology/cosmology(which one?).

Furthermore, philosophical monism rejects the first kind of dualism, not just the second.

entry 25

2 very different interpretations/versions of dualism, i.e. of distinctions between the extended, material reality/objects and the mental reality/objects and of questions of the type:

Why should it be that how something feels cannot be identified with any physical property?(*, **)

To an analytic philosopher, this is a problem of how to [correctly] connect/relate certain symbols/words/terms (‘feel’, ‘experience’, ‘physical property’, ‘material object’, etc.) to a domain of reference, which is the pre-existing domain of external, objective reality.

Whereas, alternatively, it is instead an analysis of the concept of experience vs the concept of physical property – and an analysis of the relation between these 2 concepts.

In other words, the prior is an analysis of relations between symbols and a pre-defined domain of reference, i.e. pre-supposing a certain reality –

while the latter is an analysis of relations between two sets of ideas/concepts, entirely independently of domain of reference, i.e. before defining the properties of the reality to which the ideas are applied…

Or, put even more radically or critically: the prior is simply a question of how to define words to make them fit a given worldview – which is a technical, not a philosophical endeavour,

whereas the latter approach tries to discover and see the full idea under each of the two terms/words, because it leaves open the possibility that these ideas – which each are positive result of a long historical development and are each extremely important and central to many (different) people and traditions – may, if treated respectfully, be impetus/fuel/tools for doubting and developing our worldview/reality. That is philosophy.

*In this particular wording, the question and dualism is discussed in Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979 Princeton University Press)

** put differently: Are terms/words/ideas regarding subjective experience necessary, or can one fully cover/capture subjective experience with the terms/concepts that are called ‘physical’ in the cosmology/language of adherents to mainstream science/reality.