Tag: meta-philosophy

59

Maybe it is very significant that analytic philosophy has a traditional consensus that words have meaning, not things.

An analytic philosopher is so used to the praxis of this consensus that this may sound like a bizarre attack on a notion that is trivially correct. But isn’t this actually a pre-supposition that’s both obviously contingent/questionable & vastly impactful/consequential? (& indeed ideological, begging much explanation?)

  • furthermore, words are taken as having (primarily or only) extensional meaning, which can be regarded as disconnecting/removing meaning from individual minds/persons…

so: Therefore, naturally focusing on that which seems most meaningful – and specifically words being that -, the focus of the analytic methodology and tradition in general is on words! – And this focus and prioritisation in turn(, especially considered beyond the limited aspects/interests of philosophical enquiry,) gives words[, in principal and in general,] authority and power.

or, more simply: The rational mind sees words as the locus of meaning, therefore focuses on words, thereby endowing them with power… Rational traditions supports the power of the words, and more specifically commands and law-utterances, of authorities. I.e. such traditions support [power-]hierarchy.

  • So, this seems to fit perfectly with the law & order of [the lord] god & [church] hierarchy – & theology?

– Both the things [esp. nature] & the common/lay people have no [inherent] meaning – & should thus submit under the law/order of the word, the word that is authority and power due to carrying/holding meaning, indeed the totalised, objective meaning of the god-perspective – whether explicitly or implicitly – whether administered by a monk or a philosopher…

p.s. just as a reminder for contrast: The alternative is to consider it generally reasonable and possible that things have meaning – natural entities, phenomena, people, etc. – whilst words are just compromising, abstracting tools of communication between minds and meanings. (And of course, why not also that things are meaning? – An absurd notion in our reality, but really not absurd at all.)

50

Was vielleicht all die verschiedenen Theoretiker der politischen Freiheit übersehen:

Freiheit kann niemals durch ein institutionalisierte Freiheitspolitik/-theorie gewährleistet werden, sondern nur durch lebendiges, aktives Denken der Menschen/Bürger…

Egal wie die materielle+rechtliche Institutionalisierung einer politischen Freiheitstheorie beschaffen ist, ausschlaggebend ist letzenendes die mentale/geistliche Ebene, the minds of the people… und wenn es so etwas wie eine lebendige Freiheitsidee/-tradition/-bewegung gibt, dann ist die genaue momentane Beschaffung der Institutionen [nachdem eine gewisse Schwelle überschritten wird] auch egal…

oder anders gesagt: Wenn eine gute Freiheitstheorie gefunden worden ist und der nächste Schritt darin besteht, die Theorie zu institutionalisieren, dann wurde die Theorie umsonst gedunden. Denn der nächste Schritt muss vielmehr sein, diese neue Vorstellung der Freiheit zu verbreiten bzw. sich lebendig/natürlich verbreiten zu lassen und sich aus eigener Kraft durchzusetzen und mit erst im Laufe dessen entfachter Kreativität umzusetzen.

späterer Zusatz:

Vielleicht ist der Punkt hier soetwas wie: Theoretiker der Freiheit suchen nach der richtigen/idealen Vorstellung/Version von politischer Freiheit, überlegen aber nicht ob diese Vorstellung vereinbar ist mit ihrer eventuellen Umsetzung+Intitutionalisierung im bestehenden System(Politik/Staat/Recht/Medien etc.)…  sondern nehmen an, dass ihre Aufgabe einfach das Finden der richtigen Vorstellung ist, welche sie dann der Gesellschaft/Politik übergeben und auf eine gute Umsetzung hoffen… Tatsächlich kann(und tut) aber die innere Struktur/Logik der bestehenden Systeme der politischen Freiheit(=stheorie) widersprechen, was das ganze Projekt zum scheitern verurteilt.

Wenn man die Maxime der Freiheit findet, dann ist es leider kontraproduktiv, diese Maxime zum Gesetz zu machen.

 

 

 

44

[Standard] Rational realism says that the subjective/mental depends on the objective/material and not vice versa:  the objective/material is independent of the subject/mental. This note explores the implications of a whole society/culture assuming this kind of realism.

Consider that in a hierarchically structured society/economy/state/system* one’s ability to determine/manipulate/change the objective/intersubjective/material/practical level [of reality] depends on one’s position in hierarchy – on the degree to which one has wealth/resources/influence/standing/privilege/power…

And so, for the lower levels of the hierarchical system, given that this form of realism says that they cannot improve their position by means of their own subjectivity/mental, namely that they cannot collectively imagine and re-configure reality, the ruled/lower classes/levels must believe/feel that, for them, the overall hierarchical structure/system is fixed, an unchangeable objective fact – that they are powerless to change it. …So rational realism/reality is perfectly suited to reify and support a hierarchy.

Just to re-iterate:

We have personal and communal imagination, ideals, goals. These belong to the subjective realm in the dualistic categorization of rational realism. According to this realism, the subjective realm is determined by the objective realm and not vice versa (which follows from the notion that the objective realm is independent of the subjective). Therefore, if we want to realise/materialize our imagination, we must do this indirectly through the objective realm: we must accrue resources/abilities in the objective/material realm with which we can then change things in accordance to our imagination. …And, in turn, that can only be done by functioning and attaining success in the currently institutionalised systems of material resources/abilities** – and these systems may be hierarchical. And without doing so, we cannot change institutionalized systems, as these belong to the objective realm.

It tricks us into thinking that in order to change the system we need to be granted power by the system.

 

* or a power-hierarchy, a hierarchically organized complex/network/tradition of wealth/influence/institutional status, etc.
By ‘hierarchy’ I largely mean multi-level systems such, that higher levels can control/exploit/influence lower levels (and not vice versa, at least not to the same degree) – with that system being sanctified by its ideology.
** Which means [unconsciously] adapting one’s character/beliefs to fit that specific reality and the mechanisms of the objects of that reality, namely things like money, dominance, status, exploitation, power, privilege…

entry 37

Das Problem der Verbindung von Bewusstsein und materieller Welt wird nur dann besser beschreibbar sein, wenn wir zunächst einmal sowohl von einem vorgegebenen Konzept des Bewusstseins wie auch von einem vorgegebenen Konzept einer materiellen Welt absehen. Wir werden nur dann fortschreiten können, wenn wir uns zunächst von den Prämissen der [modernen] Welt trennen. Später wird sich dann zeigen, dass die alltäglichen Konzepte nicht verloren gehen, sondern nur suspendiert werden mussten, um einen neuen Ansatz zu ermöglichen. Unter veränderten Rahmenbedingungen können sie dann wieder eingeführt werden und unter veränderten Interpretationsbidungen erneut zur Geltung kommen.

– eine Art philosophisches Manifesto, frei zitiert von Frank Vogelsang: Offene Wirklichkeit (2012) s.105

entry 36

two kinds of dualism: a second attempt at adequately expressing the distinction that I attempted to express in entry 25.

The first kind of dualism is a conceptual distinction: it simply says that if something exists, it is either material or mental and not both – and that these two categories are valid/adequate/complete.

The second kind of dualism is a statement of existence of things from both categories of the aforementioned distinction, so of [some] things that are mental and of [some]things that are material. In other words that some of the things that exist/are real are material and others are mental – that both categories are non-empty, thus of course also implying the validity/adequacy of the two concepts.

I want to make it clear that these are two very different statements, made on different levels.

The first kind of dualism is an idea about two ontological concepts as concepts. So, one could say, an idea about cosmology/ontology, a position in meta-cosmology, and in philosophical ontology.

While the second kind of dualism is an idea about entities/objects – a statement that uses two [pre-existing] ontological concepts as predicates/categories to state the existence/reality of certain sets of entities. So one could say the second kind of dualism is a position in cosmology or maybe in applied ontology: it is a determination made about the entities found in the language/culture of that thinker’s environment/tradition. Namely, it is the determination that some of the things of the thinker’s world that exist are material/non-mental, while other things of the thinker’s world that exist are non-material, mental.

Again, in the first meaning, dualism is a general statement made on the philosophical level, about all concepts, regardless of their domain of reference, especially regardless of whether their extension is non-empty. So, in this meaning, the distinction between dualist and non-dualist or monist is made in a philosophical/thought situation where neither the existence and non-existence of any entities is assumed, nor a particular [meta-]categorization of concepts into those for mental, non-material entities and those for material, non-mental entities. Here, dualism is itself a [meta]-categorization/taxonomy of ontological concepts – it takes all ontological concepts and places each in one of the two categories. This is philosophy.

In the second meaning, dualism is a general statement made about entities that one takes to exist/be real, i.e. the universe or reality: that the entities that exist/make up reality fall into two distinct, fundamental categories, so that some of the entities that exist/are real are non-conscious, non-mental, and extended  and others of the entities that exist/are real have the opposite set of properties, namely they are non-material, mental entities. It is doubtful whether this is philosophy.

Now, it should be clear that the second kind of dualism implies/pre-supposes the first, while the inverse is not the case. Significantly, one can hold dualism of the first kind while rejecting dualism of the second kind. (!) For example, one can be a dualist of the first kind [, accepting the material-mental categorization, ] and be a materialist, meaning that all the things one sees as existing/being real fall into the material category. In fact, this is normal for materialism: it is one of the options within a dualist conceptual framework – it is a dualist ontology/cosmology(which one?).

Furthermore, philosophical monism rejects the first kind of dualism, not just the second.

entry 32

A philosopher should have a mind that is very open – to new ways of thinking and unusual judgements. But the more you open your mind, the harder it is to coherently and rationally process and formulate what comes flooding in – the multiplicity of corresponding, simultaneous and parallel aspects, dimensions and possibilities of existence or meaning!

So there is a dilemma in philosophy between narrowing ones mind to better be able to rationally process, formulate and communicate thought and opening ones mind – progressively bringing into visibility and then examining and questioning deeper boundaries and assumptions – which is necessary for more profound philosophy.

Or, to rephrase and maybe clarify this juxtaposition:

Rational analysis or criticism requires a narrowing and tightening of definitions and concepts. One tries to isolate an object [of inquiry], tuning out or eliminating all else.

Whilst if one doesn’t just want to destroy ideas and adapt ones existing theory/reality accordingly but wants to be capable of finding something new, something different from ideas present in and produced by culture – thoughts that don’t [just] seem wrong from the previous perspective but instead seem weird or alien – then mind must be expanded, consciousness relaxed, and boundaries dissolved in order to allow oneself to see and change* ones pre-existent [cultural] structures/frameworks of judgement, conception and perception. In case this still sounds out-landish, consider: Ones way of analysing an object must itself be subject to philosophy, and as it can’t be applied to itself, as this eventually leads to an antimony or a confusion of levels, it must simply be looked at**.

And indeed philosophy’s whole purpose should be to keep [our] reality’s structure alive, supple and adaptive, i.e. avoiding ossification around tightly fixed [theory] frameworks: Philosophy seeks new ways of thinking and seeing.


*by ‘change’ I really mean that one loosens or liquifies a part of ones mind and then lets it work itself out. That’s how it really works, and I think what doesn’t work is deliberately and urgently seeking and choosing a substitute identity for that part of ones mind, as discussed in previous notes.

**Or you could also think of this next [recursive] step thus: you have
to allow your mind to open/relax, and only then can your method itself
become object of the usual kind of analysis. For usually ones method’s structure remains, for expediency, assumed and unquestioned. I ultimately don’t think this view works
though – truly the work of philosophy or analysis is always
founded/grounded/standing in a level that is non-rational and unseen,
and if one tries to move down in order to bring that level into
rationality, one then uses a next non-rational level. But this is fine: Non-rational conception is perfectly legitimate and indeed is a fine foundation for rational thought under the condition that one keeps looking at this foundation – instead of denying it – and keeps it free of [anti-philosophical] restraints imposed arbitrarily, letting it adapt and grow as required. It grows like a plant or a fungus or a river, and so is very reliable (and beautiful).

 

entry 31

Philosophical training as the taming/tempering of the feeling of being convinced* by an argument:

Through a long process of repeatedly studying arguments, feeling convinced by them and then each time realising that there is an equally convincing (and rational) counter-argument, the threshold for being convinced gradually rises and one feels less and less convinced by rational arguments. At the end, only a perfect argument [, which has the character of direct, visual understanding,] elicits the feeling of being convinced.

That is maybe the central training/disciplining of rational thinking, and the central learning technique of philosophical training. It disciplines rationality in that it teaches one the limitations and pitfalls of rationality – of analysis by [logical] argumentation – it balances the radical ambitions of abstract analysis, instilling humility into the thinker who wants to attempt abstraction of the world – especially by means of argumentative analysis of ideas.

This practice leads to a gradual increase of the degree to which one is intuitively careful, skeptical and critical toward the tools of logical/abstract/rational analysis/argumentation themselves – a kind of meta-criticism or meta-criticalness. And, importantly, this resulting reflective skeptical stance toward rationalistic, abstract criticism somewhat ironically has the effect of gradually opening the mind, as it makes one slower to dismiss an idea that one has counter-arguments to! This is maybe the dialectic extreme/final limit/end of rationality.

– [Paranoid/simplistic] conspiracy theorists lack this training & ability, whilst also being very open-minded [by natural pre-disposition], and thus their open minds are too easily and quickly filled/satisfied by [non-perfect] argumentation (maybe argumentation that is critical of some mainstream position and that suggests some non-mainstream idea) – their minds are quickly, suddenly filled by a huge, un-tempered feeling of convincedness – a feeling they aren’t trained to handle and have no reason to question.


*re. ‘the feeling of being convinced’: To me this is one of the most useful concepts and most important phenomenal/experiential elements of the practice of philosophy. In more detail, what I mean by this: I mean a feeling in the sense of the sort of phenomenon/experience that one also calls an intuition. And I mean a feeling that appears/happens at some point while one is studying/receiving an argument/line of reasoning: at some point, while studying an argument, one starts to feel convinced, or notices that one feels convinced. I’m suggesting a non-rational or irrational, intuitive component to the practice of studying, reading and judging arguments – which is of course at-odds with the normal view of the study and judgement of arguments being an entirely rational process that entirely corresponds to philosophical, abstract theories of logic/of the structure of arguments. Supporting this view that there is always a non-rational, intuitive component to the enterprise of logical analysis is a matter for a later entry.

entry 30

The following analysis attempts to explain a very broad trend among philosophers [and in philosophy-related discussion] of using ‘idealism’ slightly negatively – tending to identify certain naive & absurd worldviews and associate them with idealism – and tending to then, as a theoretical/rational consequence of their opposition to such worldviews, label themselves as materialists or realists:

on how, paradoxically, philosophers on both [main] sides of the question of the status of reality see the other side as idealistic

 

From one perspective, which could be called the perspective of a [naive-]realist,

When someone claims that one’s reality, and in particular familiar, every-day, macroscopic things/objects, is/are a product of mind/theory, then this claim seems idealist. Firstly, it amounts to the claim that reality is not independent of the subject, i.e. is subjective. Furthermore, due to the fact that to a realist, reality is necessarily co-extensional with the totality of the cosmos and nature, it seems to also amount to idealism, i.e. to the view that the whole cosmos – everything that exists or is or will be true or factual – somehow consists of ideas and is determined by consciousness/mind. (- which seems absurd)

Meanwhile, from another perspective, which could be called the perspective of a philosophical realist/dialectic realist/non-realist,

The realist’s belief that their reality is objective and ultimate – when in truth it is a structure of experiences that is/are contingent on a particular set of ideologies/theories/worldviews interacting, through the person, with nature – is naive and idealistic: It amounts to a failure to make a conceptual or ontological distinction between a) our ideas’ manifestations/consequences and b) the [as-yet-unknown] totality/fabric/structure/truth of nature/cosmos.

 

 

To a non-realist/dialectical realist, anyone’s reality is, at all levels of interpretation and observation, inextricable from that person’s ideas, theory, ideology, mind.

We don’t know that the entities we posit in our realities truly correspond to anything [in absolute reality/nature]. Much rather, we know that the entities we posit are preliminary results of an evolutionary, dialectic process of humanity’s (and in general life’s) reciprocal interaction with environment. And we don’t know whether there may be whole areas/dimensions that cannot [yet] be encompassed by our current reality’s languages, worldviews, mindsets, theories, concepts and natural interpretations/perceptions.

Furthermore, no person’s reality* can reach the numinous Ding-an-Sich (Kant), nor reach its ineffable Real (Lacan).

A realist doesn’t notice the conceptual difference between a) [the concept of] reality, or more specifically the realist’s own world (which is the world that the person sees/believes in, as mediated through abstractions that fit observation), and b) [the concept of] whatever may lie outside, behind, beyond or under what we call or think of as reality. This distinction is simply not made. Even if the difference is noticed, it is ignored due to impracticality, and [thus] doesn’t affect the realist’s worldview. Or in other words, a realist doesn’t take into account their own mind’s fallibility and incompleteness: the realist at the same time a) takes reality to be total/absolute and b) calls their own [incomplete and fallible] world ‘reality’…

  • This idea – this prima-facie balance of two opposing ways of relating to ‘idealism’ or two ways of integrating the concept of idealism into one’s conceptual structure – forms/constitutes a philosophically central dialectic, or at least its starting position.
  • This idealism paradox is related to the subject-object paradox: That any object is, ironically, necessarily dependent on a subject, as every object is an object to or of a subject. Without such a subject in whose world the object is posited and thus exists, the object would just be whatever it is apart from being some subject’s object…which is ineffable! And so, objects are, one could say, subjective… and thus it is again (to me/to a dialectical anti-realist) idealistic to treat objects, or things, as being independent of ourselves.
  • The impracticality of distinguishing between reality and whatever lies beyond reality starts right at the most theoretical, abstract level: One side of the distinction is, ultimately, ineffable [at any point in time]. And, under rationalism, one avoids discussing the ineffable… And thus the practice of rationalism leads to, or at least strongly suggests, realism. Or, to put it in a way that may seem problematic to a rationalist and to a realist: Rationalism, in practice, has ontological consequences! Namely, through eschewing the ineffable, one automatically only allows a subset of all [conceptually/philosophically] possible ontologies: those that are narrowed around that which is currently speakable, and thus narrowed around that which is part of currently mainstream/dominant ideology/language, ontologies that conform to [current] reality.

*note: I am using ‘reality’ as a particular.  For the reasons listed in this note, I primarily see reality as a particular, but, to be complete, and to already move towards a next step in this dialectic, I am open to there being 2 types of reality: particular and total. I.e. maybe totality is itself a reality, the extreme/limit case of reality.

entry 28

meta-philosophical suspicion/hypothesis:

When philosophers (such as Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend) criticize contemporary philosophy through radical questioning of the legitimacy/foundations of epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie) – epistemology being right at the heart of philosophy – I think what they are truly attacking isn’t exactly epistemology in general, but instead specifically rationalist epistemology. And thus, despite providing cogent critiques of contemporary philosophical tradition, the negative conclusions that they draw on philosophy in general are too broad/general.

There is a trend of self-abasement in philosophy: of philosophers arguing that philosophy itself is a misguided, counter-productive and over-valued tradition/under-taking. In particular philosophy as an abstract tradition and philosophy as essentially epistemology. In this context, both Feyerabend and Rorty regularly draw connections to rationalism, e.g. to trends originating with Descartes or with pre-Socratics – their criticisms are made largely within contexts of identifying historical & theoretical consequences of various forms of rationalism. But they fail to reach the conclusion that this rationalistic form of philosophy which they criticize is of course contingent on whether philosophers operate within rationalism.The contents of their criticisms suggest that the epistemologies/philosophies they criticize are not the only possible/potential forms of philosophy…

And while I agree with their criticisms, I think that their criticisms are in fact themselves epistemology: they are epistemological, or meta-epistemological*, discussions and criticisms of rationalistic epistemologies! Their detailed, philosophical, critical exploration of the flaws of certain contemporary theories of and assumptions about knowledge are exactly what epistemology truly is! And indeed, this is philosophy.

*To me, it is relevant that a meta-level is involved, that the writings I have in mind are philosophy of epistemology. And, at the same time, I think a philosophical epistemology is one that includes – or rather appears only together with an attempt at – the next meta-level… And this goes for any topic or discipline… And this maybe a key distinction to rationalistic epistemology: that rationalistic epistemology is without the meta-level, presenting itself as an abstraction that is simply true in a vacuum. And this is anti-philosophical.