45

attempt on the practical structure of dialectical/free thought
 

first:
You start with some assumption p. It’s not a consciously chosen thesis, it’s more a working hypothesis that pre-exists in you for whatever reasons. You go through life, acting and observing, under this assumption p.
 
secondly:
you reach a point where you have noticed so many contradictions to p that you start to assume/posit the negation: you consciously entertain the possibility that p was wrong, that non-p, and you start re-forming your behaviour and character to fit the practical consequences of non-p.
This is where critical thought and maybe deutero-re-learning starts.
 
thirdly:
Having then gone through life under the assumption non-p, and thus assuming those theses that arise/occur after a time of going through life under the base assumption non-p, you reach a point where you have noticed so many contradictions to those theses that this option doesn’t seem viable either.[!]
There are two options for your response to this:
Standard logic/reason dictates that if non-p is false, then p must in fact be true – that you’ve missed something or must simply return back to the original p.
Meanwhile, dialectical logic opens the possibility that {p, non-p} is an imcomplete set of options due to the possibility that p and non-p are in fact at the same end of an under-lying concept, causing the hypotheses of both p and non-p to exclude certain possibilities.
So: you take a step back and re-examined the concepts/terms that p consists of or pre-supposes.
This is where free thought starts – at the point where you realise that the ideas/concepts behind p simply aren’t adequate, so that it stops being a matter of correct judgement and becomes a matter of re-conceptualization.
 
 
and a simplified, generalised example:
Looking at some aspect of the world, you see the options in this aspect are A and B.
You learn that option A doesn’t work.
You deduce that option B must/should work.

You miss the possibility that both A and B are products of a contingent property of the world, a property whose
change would produce option C.

This possibility implies that B might not
be significantly better than A – and this despite A being discarded and A and B seeming to be the complete available options.

entry 25

2 very different interpretations/versions of dualism, i.e. of distinctions between the extended, material reality/objects and the mental reality/objects and of questions of the type:

Why should it be that how something feels cannot be identified with any physical property?(*, **)

To an analytic philosopher, this is a problem of how to [correctly] connect/relate certain symbols/words/terms (‘feel’, ‘experience’, ‘physical property’, ‘material object’, etc.) to a domain of reference, which is the pre-existing domain of external, objective reality.

Whereas, alternatively, it is instead an analysis of the concept of experience vs the concept of physical property – and an analysis of the relation between these 2 concepts.

In other words, the prior is an analysis of relations between symbols and a pre-defined domain of reference, i.e. pre-supposing a certain reality –

while the latter is an analysis of relations between two sets of ideas/concepts, entirely independently of domain of reference, i.e. before defining the properties of the reality to which the ideas are applied…

Or, put even more radically or critically: the prior is simply a question of how to define words to make them fit a given worldview – which is a technical, not a philosophical endeavour,

whereas the latter approach tries to discover and see the full idea under each of the two terms/words, because it leaves open the possibility that these ideas – which each are positive result of a long historical development and are each extremely important and central to many (different) people and traditions – may, if treated respectfully, be impetus/fuel/tools for doubting and developing our worldview/reality. That is philosophy.

ex

*In this particular wording, the question and dualism is discussed in Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979 Princeton University Press)

** put differently: Are terms/words/ideas regarding subjective experience necessary, or can one fully cover/capture subjective experience with the terms/concepts that are called ‘physical’ in the cosmology/language of adherents to mainstream science/reality.