Tag: rationality

42

Horkheimer on instrumental reason, means and ends: selected quotation and comments

(aus: Gesammelte Schriften Band 6, 1991, p 27,28; Hervorhebungen etc. von mir)

“[…]dass vernünftige Dinge […] nützliche Dinge sind und dass jeder vernünftige Mensch imstande sein soll zu entscheiden, was ihm nützt. […] die Kraft, die letztlich vernünftige Handlungen ermöglicht, ist die Fähigkeit der Klassifikation, des Schließens und der Deduktion, ganz gleich, worin der besondere Inhalt besteht¹ – das abstrakte funtionieren des Denkmechanismus. Diese Art von Vernunft kann subjektive Vernunft genannt werden. Sie hat es wesentlich mit Mittel und Zwecken zu tun, mit der Angemessenheit von Verfahrensweisen an Ziele, die mehr oder minder hingenommen werden und sich vermeintlich von selbst verstehen. Sie legt der Frage wenig Bedeutung bei, ob die Ziele als solche vernünftig sind. Befasst sie sich überhaupt mit Zwecken, dann hält sie es für ausgemacht, dass auch sie vernünftig im subjektiven Sinne sind, d.h., dass sie dem Interesse des Subjekts im Hinblick auf seine Selbsterhaltung dienen – sei es die des einzelnen Individuums oder die der Gemeinschaft, von deren Fortbestand der des Individuums abhängt.² Der Gedanke, dass ein Ziel um seiner selbst willen vernünftig sein kann[…], ohne auf irgendeine Art subjektiven Gewinnes oder Vorteils sich zu beziehen, ist der subjektiven Vernunft zutiefst fremd, selbst wo sie […]sich Reflexionen über die Gesellschaftsordnung, betrachtet als Ganzes, widmet.

[…]diese Definition der Vernunft […] ist ein wichtiges Symptom eines tiefgreinfenden Wandels der Anschauungsweisen, der in den letzten Jahrhunderten im abendländischen Denken stattgefunden hat. Lange Zeit herrschte eine diametral entgegengesetzte Ansicht von der Vernunft. Diese Ansicht behauptete das Dasein der Vernunft als einer objektiven Welt – in der Beziehungen zwischen den Menschen und zwischen sozialen Klassen, in gesellschaftlichen Institutionen, in der Natur und ihren Manifestationen. […] auf einer objektiven Theorie der Vernunft begründet. Sie zielte darauf ab, ein umfassendes System oder eine Hierarchie alles Seienden einschließlich des Menschen und seiner Zwecke zu entfalten. Der Grad der Vernünftigkeit des Lebens eines Menschen konnte nach seiner Harmonie mit dieser Totalität bestimmt werden. Deren objektive Struktur, und nicht bloß der Mensch und seine Zwecke, sollte der Maßstab für individuelle Gedanken und Handlungen sein. Dieser Begriff von Vernunft schloß subjektive Vernunft niemals aus, sondern betrachtete sie als partiellen, beschränkten Ausdruck einer umfassenden Vernünftigkeit, von der Kriterien für alle Dinge und Lebewesen abgeleitet wurde. Der Nachdruck lag mehr auf den Zwecken als auf den Mitteln²,³. Das höchste Bestreben dieser Art von Denken war es, die objektive Ordnung des >Vernünftigen<, wie die Philosophie sie begriff, mit dem menschlichen Dasein einschließlich des Selbstinteresses und der Selbsterhaltung zu versöhnen.

[…]

Zwischen der Theorie, derzufolge Vernunft ein der Wirklichkeit innewohnendes Prinzip ist, und der Lehre, sie sei ein subjektives Vermögen des Geistes, besteht ein grundlegender Unterschied. Nach der letzteeren kann einzig das Subjekt in einerm genuinen Sinne Vernunft haben[…].”

comments:

¹ ‘Inhalt’ ist hier wohl Begriff- bzw Idee-inkludierend gemeint (was eigentlich allgemein der Fall sein sollte, da jeder Inhalt als Begriff gesehen werden kann)… Vom Inhalt abzusehen bedeutet eigentlich auch, dass man von den Begriffen absieht, sodass es eine [reine] Urteils-(lehre/logik/vernunft) ist, (bzw. sein soll)keine Begriffslehre… I think ‘Inhalt’, which means content, should here be read as: everything apart from the logical structure as per the formal logic( in which one abstracts specific concepts away, replacing them with predicates, i.e. stripped of internal structure/meaning and replaced by sets of objects of the reference domain.) I note this because this notion of reason becomes more radical/stark/abstract when one considers how it fits with the basic meta-philosophical distinction between philosophy as a structure of judgements and philosophy as a structure of concepts: Considering that logicians see only the logical form of a statement/argument as content-independent, with the logical form being such that the so-called predicates function independent of any specific identity of the predicate’s concept… ideas/concepts are thus counted to the realm of content and are ignored… So, indeed, this kind of reason is a mechanical system of deduction for external/abstract judgements like ‘true’, ‘conclusive’, ‘real’ or ‘useful’…

² Instrumental/teleological Ethics is all about judging/choosing something by whether it is a means to the end/telos… but this instrumental action/decision/thing  is judged/analysed/considered solely in relation to the telos, i.e. not per se…i.e. it is chosen through its instrumentalised abstraction, whilst the rest of its identity, relations & consequences are [deliberately] ignored!

³ …& thus paradoxically, in an E. that is about choosing means, any means are potentially acceptable – means are handled blindly…


after-thought:
choosing Urteilslehre [or Begriffslehre?]rests on the Urteil/Begriff dichotomy: on assuming that one can make a judgement within an objective, non-doxic concept framework… Which, given that, actually, each chosen concept is chosen,
amounts to the insane folly of believing that judgement can be independent of belief…

entry 32

A philosopher should have a mind that is very open – to new ways of thinking and unusual judgements. But the more you open your mind, the harder it is to coherently and rationally process and formulate what comes flooding in – the multiplicity of corresponding, simultaneous and parallel aspects, dimensions and possibilities of existence or meaning!

So there is a dilemma in philosophy between narrowing ones mind to better be able to rationally process, formulate and communicate thought and opening ones mind – progressively bringing into visibility and then examining and questioning deeper boundaries and assumptions – which is necessary for more profound philosophy.

Or, to rephrase and maybe clarify this juxtaposition:

Rational analysis or criticism requires a narrowing and tightening of definitions and concepts. One tries to isolate an object [of inquiry], tuning out or eliminating all else.

Whilst if one doesn’t just want to destroy ideas and adapt ones existing theory/reality accordingly but wants to be capable of finding something new, something different from ideas present in and produced by culture – thoughts that don’t [just] seem wrong from the previous perspective but instead seem weird or alien – then mind must be expanded, consciousness relaxed, and boundaries dissolved in order to allow oneself to see and change* ones pre-existent [cultural] structures/frameworks of judgement, conception and perception. In case this still sounds out-landish, consider: Ones way of analysing an object must itself be subject to philosophy, and as it can’t be applied to itself, as this eventually leads to an antimony or a confusion of levels, it must simply be looked at**.

And indeed philosophy’s whole purpose should be to keep [our] reality’s structure alive, supple and adaptive, i.e. avoiding ossification around tightly fixed [theory] frameworks: Philosophy seeks new ways of thinking and seeing.


*by ‘change’ I really mean that one loosens or liquifies a part of ones mind and then lets it work itself out. That’s how it really works, and I think what doesn’t work is deliberately and urgently seeking and choosing a substitute identity for that part of ones mind, as discussed in previous notes.

**Or you could also think of this next [recursive] step thus: you have
to allow your mind to open/relax, and only then can your method itself
become object of the usual kind of analysis. For usually ones method’s structure remains, for expediency, assumed and unquestioned. I ultimately don’t think this view works
though – truly the work of philosophy or analysis is always
founded/grounded/standing in a level that is non-rational and unseen,
and if one tries to move down in order to bring that level into
rationality, one then uses a next non-rational level. But this is fine: Non-rational conception is perfectly legitimate and indeed is a fine foundation for rational thought under the condition that one keeps looking at this foundation – instead of denying it – and keeps it free of [anti-philosophical] restraints imposed arbitrarily, letting it adapt and grow as required. It grows like a plant or a fungus or a river, and so is very reliable (and beautiful).

 

entry 21

Everyone has biases, always, & it’s OK to have biases.
And the mitigation, reduction and transcendence of biases that is prescribed by rationalism – by the ideals/principles of rationality – is folly.
 
[A proponent of ideals of rationality may reply that this results in pure relativism, ]but actually this needn’t/doesn’t result in relativism:
What’s important isn’t whether one has biases, but whether one’s biases are fixed* or can move, i.e. whether there is a dogma that is a/the fixed (and oft-unnoticed) source of one’s biases or whether one[‘s mind] is open to dialectic, unconstrained movement of ideas & evolution of theories/paradigms & organic growth and development of the overall ideological/theoretical/philosophical [meta-]structure…
 
I’m suggesting a mode of thinking that results not in biases being reduced [until they maybe disappear], but instead results in uncovering of a bias going hand-in-hand with a new, biased part of theory/mind being produced** – of which the bias later should/can be uncovered… So this is a step-wise, indefinitely continuing process by which a theory or mind or philosophy organically changes and grows.
 
And maybe on the meta-level I’m distinguishing between two ways of thinking/doing philosophy: seeing biases as negative or seeing them as interesting and as a necessary component of any temporary theory that one uses before one has reached the totality [of knowledge] (which of course nobody has and is indefinitely far in the future…
 

*if they are fixed, and one insists on reduction of bias, then the result is denial.

**meanwhile, the part/structure of theory/mind that one has found a bias in isn’t sanitized and maintained – it is commensurately exited/abandoned as one’s ideas move and one’s mind shifts to a new theory – the shifting of biases is a logical result of the movement/change of ideas. (or it is (temporarily) accepted along with its bias…)

entry 20

Rationality: speakable & correctly spoken thought

One key aspect of rational thought is that it is speakable: To be or become rational, a thought is reduced to its speakable part or version, and any part or aspect that isn’t expressible in language is rejected or denied.

A potential criticism of rationalistic thinking, philosophy and theory-building presents itself when one considers aspects of our world that are at the same time of deepest importance whilst not being speakable, for example beauty: Beauty can never be fully caught by definitions, transcending and eluding any attempt to [linguistically] capture or grasp or fix.* …And therefore, in a rationalistic worldview/reality, beauty is ultimately rejected or relegated to the level of mere relativistic & irrelevant ästhetics…

A further core component of rational traditions is that one must use language correctly [when expressing the speakable]… This makes the false assumption that we know how to use language correctly and thus have the ability to use language correctly and avoid using it incorrectly… I think it should be clear that this is an absurd assumption.**

 
This is one of many instances where I collect [suspected or observed] aspects of rationality or rationalism as part my anti-rationalism project:

I’ve been trying to find out what rationality and rationalism is and how related thought, theory, tradition, culture and history may be affected by this, i.e. how rationalism shapes our world and how it relates to other contemporary paradigms of mainstream [thought and] reality.

I think readers can agree that the concept of rationality is, explicitly or implicitly, a major factor/part in contemporary worldviews, both within and outside of intellectual/scientific institutions. I want to find out how important it is and what exactly it is – and what its function is. And by ‘rationalism‘ I mean whole methodologies or traditions that are built out of or on the more basic concept of rationality.

This project is a process of exploration and speculation. I neither want to simply choose some existing definitions and base my analysis on those nor simply stipulate my own definition/usage of the terms: What I’m doing is I’m trying to find out how ‘rational’ is actually used and functions in the world and in existing traditions – even if people aren’t aware of these functions and usages – and what the concept that best fits this usage/function ultimately looks like. This is a gradual process with many observations and speculations along the way.

This is necessary because – as can be easily observed – there is no  consensus on the meaning or importance or relevance of rationality. And it has become more obvious to me over time that rationality is an astoundingly murky and ill-defined or un-defined concept – and this is especially striking considering its prominence in traditions that value clarity and definition of language so highly.***

And concerning the critical aspects of this project: In my reading I came across criticisms of past and contemporary rationalistic traditions in philosophy. I was intrigued by this unusual case of criticizing something that is usually simply assumed to be something positive and important – & from there I’ve been exploring how far and deep these criticisms and the corresponding flaws of contemporary thought & theory may go: Firstly in schools of metaphilosophy and philosophy/methodology of science – but also exploring possible connections and influences this may have on any other parts of the human world – be it a scientific tradition or economic or political doctrine or ethics/morality or any other theory, tradition or culture. I’ve continued and deepened this endeavour because it has turned out to be fascinatingly fruitful.

*Beauty really IS ineffable – and by trying too hard to eff it, you will actually just f it up.

**I won’t directly argue this point here, but will just mention some points that should be considered in this context: Consider how language actually works as a pragmatic, psychological and historical process (or result thereof). It has intuitive components. It isn’t a fixed, perfect, objective system but rather a historically grown complex of temporary inter-subjective, co-operative conventions. It’s full of quirks and multiplicities of uses of elements. Attempts at correcting natural language or translating into formal languages – i.e. at making language completely rational – are vain attempts at overcoming this and removing all undefinable parts from our thoughts. An analytical philosopher can try to use new definitions to stipulate a new, limited language game, but even then you need to somehow provide a connection to other, broader language games for your artificial language game to have any relevance or meaning – this is the point/boundary at which the philosopher tricks themself into not noticing the intuitive/irrational components of what they are doing. And, of course, one shouldn’t forget that these imprecisions, intuitive/unconscious components, pragmatic mutabilities and fluidities etc are features that make language a wonderfully powerful, adaptive tool in an ever-changing environment and society.

***in fact so murky/dark that it can actually function as a kind of everyday dogmatic basis for modern thinking that – unlike explicit dogmas – isn’t even accessible to critical inspection.

 

entry 19

some rationality basics
 
a distinction between two dimensions of rational thought – which gives two ways of questioning & judging thought:

D₁: To what degree is a thought rational? (as opposed to intuitive or para-linguistic) – this is a value-neutral dimension, i.e. it is [logically] independent of the overall quality/value/wisdom/intelligence etc. of the thought.

&

D₂: How good is a particular rational thought? I.e. once we have determined how rational the thought is (D₁), there is still the question of how good or valuable or interesting the thought is, which is [logically] independent of the degree to which the thought is rational.

Further rationalistic determinations or beliefs are required for the two dimensions not to be independent.

entry 17

In this entry I return to a my main projects: criticism of rationalism and rationality. Reading this note now, it seems rather speculative and maybe unfair. It was written several months before I planned on starting this blog, and I didn’t even write down which book the quote was from. But whether the quote is precise or correctly attributed isn’t really relevant to the main points here. And expansive speculation and mental gymnastics are productive and healthy. Also, the more dominant and historically causal/operative a tradition, the stronger society’s attempted criticism must be – as it is correspondingly more important to make sure that the tradition isn’t fundamentally flawed and imbalanced and to test/explore ways in which it might be…

How my anti-rationalism may connect to [analysis of the meaning behind] seemingly anodyne rationalist maxims, for example what Karl Popper states as a credo¹ of his:

1: ”I accept that I may be wrong” 

Consider the quote not simply at face value but in the context of Popper communicating/laying out his philosophy and calling it a credo. It seems clear that it must mean something other than the literal², particular meaning – a personal statement – as this would be trivial and irrelevant to his project. I think he means to imply a general methodological rule and that what we see here is a prescriptive/normative statement formulated as acceptance/seeing of reality – I propose that rationalists’ actual meaning of such credos/maxims is something like these paraphrases:

1p₁: I should/must admit that I am wrong in cases where [rational] reason(s) dictate so.

1p₂: If I am faced by a logically sound [counter-]argument & I am [in the moment] unable to come up with rational/explicit/clear reasons for a premise of the counter-argument being incorrect³, i.e. reasons with which to defend my position – and if I proceed based simply on a *reasonless* un-convincedness, i.e. a feeling/intuition that I am nevertheless right, then this is irrational, unreasonable of me! (and this even in the moral sense!) 

When thus interpreted, many problems arise [in a world in which we follow the credo]:

    • Conformity to standard established/accepted language – & thus to currently dominant conceptual paradigm – becomes prerequisite to inclusion in discourse! (One is excluded as soon as one sticks to a position in the face of rational reasons – despite only having a reason that doesn’t conform to the criteria of dominant rationality.)
    • Only those concepts are permitted for which there are/is currently available language/terminology.³ (If, to defend oneself, one uses a word that is meaningless to a rationalist, then they will say that you must accept you are wrong.)
    • …Non-rationalism is confused with infallibilism!

also connected:

    • debating: Adeptness in established/dominant linguo-conceptual paradigm and in ability to connect ideas/positions to the terminology of the paradigm/tradition gives a prohibitive advantage which can be utilized and presided over in a lawyerly fashion…This is a technical, non-philosophical mastery in contrast to what should really count and be made visible in debate – the brilliance of the actual idea/position.
    • conservatism: It is too easy to rationally defend established ideas and ways of speaking against new ideas that have not yet had time and space to fully take form and be institutionalized in systems of abstractions and in terminology/language/culture…

¹ It is ironic and fitting that, whilst religions state their credos openly and sincerely, rationalists state their credos with ostensible irony.

² – This would also be ironic given rationalism’s general linguistic methodology of clarity, precision and literalism.

³ see Paul Feyerabend: Erkenntnis für Freie Menschen p.47 footnote

 

entry 9

Minds that try to be rational nevertheless have some feelings/intuitive thoughts that lack a rational foundation/reason/justification. But under rationalism, it is not ok to have a purely emotionally or intuitively grounded conviction – to state a thought as true with no rational explanation/argument for it – with nothing to make it rational.

One of the natural and common reactions a mind that is trying to be rational has in this situation is to come up with* a rational reason which can replace the intuition – aka a rationalization. This lets the mind hold the originally emotionally/intuitively grounded thought/conviction [or a satisfyingly compatible one] in a rationally acceptable/permissible way.

Now, the original sub/un-conscious structures of mind – the ones that produced the feeling/intuition – are still there, and in fact become hardened and perpetuated [over time] by the presence of static rationalization that is fixed over them.

now to the main point of this note:

A potential problem arises for the mind here: If the current rationalization is rescinded/removed**, then rationalism dictates the mind negate/remove the conviction, which is a painful assault on that subconscious part of the mind that still supports the conviction.

And so, somewhat ironically, the mind trying to avoid this problem develops emotional attachment to rationalizations***, which then leads to fear, entrenchment and defensiveness…

And in my experience philosophical training implicitly shows that rationalization in this very broad sense is folly and that calmness & trust & patience & openness are more effective: one observes, in repetition ad nauseam, that even the seemingly strongest, most convincing arguments and rationalizations eventually turn out to be flawed.

And it is actually ok to have a purely emotional-intuitive [theoretical/philosophical] conviction as long as one sees and says it as such instead of rationalizing it… This is especially obvious when one considers that no conviction has a completely rational reason/justification/rationalization – if one logically follows reasons ever deeper to and into the foundations, one will always find something non-rational or a dogma…

This is part of an anti-rationalist or non-rationalist philosophy.

*which, by the way, is usually a completely intuitive/non-rational/unconscious process, and always has at least some unconscious components or base even if the [conscious] mind doesn’t notice this (the mechanism relies on the mind not noticing this, and the mind usually doesn’t.).

**and not in that moment replaced by a different rationalization with the same conclusion… hopefully I will write more related to such smooth rational transitions in later posts.

***to be clear: I use ‘rationalization’ here in a very broad and more value-neutral than usual sense, including rational theories in general – scientific theories that meet the standards of rationalist methodologies.