Tag: realism

entry 36

two kinds of dualism: a second attempt at adequately expressing the distinction that I attempted to express in entry 25.

The first kind of dualism is a conceptual distinction: it simply says that if something exists, it is either material or mental and not both – and that these two categories are valid/adequate/complete.

The second kind of dualism is a statement of existence of things from both categories of the aforementioned distinction, so of [some] things that are mental and of [some]things that are material. In other words that some of the things that exist/are real are material and others are mental – that both categories are non-empty, thus of course also implying the validity/adequacy of the two concepts.

I want to make it clear that these are two very different statements, made on different levels.

The first kind of dualism is an idea about two ontological concepts as concepts. So, one could say, an idea about cosmology/ontology, a position in meta-cosmology, and in philosophical ontology.

While the second kind of dualism is an idea about entities/objects – a statement that uses two [pre-existing] ontological concepts as predicates/categories to state the existence/reality of certain sets of entities. So one could say the second kind of dualism is a position in cosmology or maybe in applied ontology: it is a determination made about the entities found in the language/culture of that thinker’s environment/tradition. Namely, it is the determination that some of the things of the thinker’s world that exist are material/non-mental, while other things of the thinker’s world that exist are non-material, mental.

Again, in the first meaning, dualism is a general statement made on the philosophical level, about all concepts, regardless of their domain of reference, especially regardless of whether their extension is non-empty. So, in this meaning, the distinction between dualist and non-dualist or monist is made in a philosophical/thought situation where neither the existence and non-existence of any entities is assumed, nor a particular [meta-]categorization of concepts into those for mental, non-material entities and those for material, non-mental entities. Here, dualism is itself a [meta]-categorization/taxonomy of ontological concepts – it takes all ontological concepts and places each in one of the two categories. This is philosophy.

In the second meaning, dualism is a general statement made about entities that one takes to exist/be real, i.e. the universe or reality: that the entities that exist/make up reality fall into two distinct, fundamental categories, so that some of the entities that exist/are real are non-conscious, non-mental, and extended  and others of the entities that exist/are real have the opposite set of properties, namely they are non-material, mental entities. It is doubtful whether this is philosophy.

Now, it should be clear that the second kind of dualism implies/pre-supposes the first, while the inverse is not the case. Significantly, one can hold dualism of the first kind while rejecting dualism of the second kind. (!) For example, one can be a dualist of the first kind [, accepting the material-mental categorization, ] and be a materialist, meaning that all the things one sees as existing/being real fall into the material category. In fact, this is normal for materialism: it is one of the options within a dualist conceptual framework – it is a dualist ontology/cosmology(which one?).

Furthermore, philosophical monism rejects the first kind of dualism, not just the second.

entry 30

The following analysis attempts to explain a very broad trend among philosophers [and in philosophy-related discussion] of using ‘idealism’ slightly negatively – tending to identify certain naive & absurd worldviews and associate them with idealism – and tending to then, as a theoretical/rational consequence of their opposition to such worldviews, label themselves as materialists or realists:

on how, paradoxically, philosophers on both [main] sides of the question of the status of reality see the other side as idealistic

 

From one perspective, which could be called the perspective of a [naive-]realist,

When someone claims that one’s reality, and in particular familiar, every-day, macroscopic things/objects, is/are a product of mind/theory, then this claim seems idealist. Firstly, it amounts to the claim that reality is not independent of the subject, i.e. is subjective. Furthermore, due to the fact that to a realist, reality is necessarily co-extensional with the totality of the cosmos and nature, it seems to also amount to idealism, i.e. to the view that the whole cosmos – everything that exists or is or will be true or factual – somehow consists of ideas and is determined by consciousness/mind. (- which seems absurd)

Meanwhile, from another perspective, which could be called the perspective of a philosophical realist/dialectic realist/non-realist,

The realist’s belief that their reality is objective and ultimate – when in truth it is a structure of experiences that is/are contingent on a particular set of ideologies/theories/worldviews interacting, through the person, with nature – is naive and idealistic: It amounts to a failure to make a conceptual or ontological distinction between a) our ideas’ manifestations/consequences and b) the [as-yet-unknown] totality/fabric/structure/truth of nature/cosmos.

 

 

To a non-realist/dialectical realist, anyone’s reality is, at all levels of interpretation and observation, inextricable from that person’s ideas, theory, ideology, mind.

We don’t know that the entities we posit in our realities truly correspond to anything [in absolute reality/nature]. Much rather, we know that the entities we posit are preliminary results of an evolutionary, dialectic process of humanity’s (and in general life’s) reciprocal interaction with environment. And we don’t know whether there may be whole areas/dimensions that cannot [yet] be encompassed by our current reality’s languages, worldviews, mindsets, theories, concepts and natural interpretations/perceptions.

Furthermore, no person’s reality* can reach the numinous Ding-an-Sich (Kant), nor reach its ineffable Real (Lacan).

A realist doesn’t notice the conceptual difference between a) [the concept of] reality, or more specifically the realist’s own world (which is the world that the person sees/believes in, as mediated through abstractions that fit observation), and b) [the concept of] whatever may lie outside, behind, beyond or under what we call or think of as reality. This distinction is simply not made. Even if the difference is noticed, it is ignored due to impracticality, and [thus] doesn’t affect the realist’s worldview. Or in other words, a realist doesn’t take into account their own mind’s fallibility and incompleteness: the realist at the same time a) takes reality to be total/absolute and b) calls their own [incomplete and fallible] world ‘reality’…

  • This idea – this prima-facie balance of two opposing ways of relating to ‘idealism’ or two ways of integrating the concept of idealism into one’s conceptual structure – forms/constitutes a philosophically central dialectic, or at least its starting position.
  • This idealism paradox is related to the subject-object paradox: That any object is, ironically, necessarily dependent on a subject, as every object is an object to or of a subject. Without such a subject in whose world the object is posited and thus exists, the object would just be whatever it is apart from being some subject’s object…which is ineffable! And so, objects are, one could say, subjective… and thus it is again (to me/to a dialectical anti-realist) idealistic to treat objects, or things, as being independent of ourselves.
  • The impracticality of distinguishing between reality and whatever lies beyond reality starts right at the most theoretical, abstract level: One side of the distinction is, ultimately, ineffable [at any point in time]. And, under rationalism, one avoids discussing the ineffable… And thus the practice of rationalism leads to, or at least strongly suggests, realism. Or, to put it in a way that may seem problematic to a rationalist and to a realist: Rationalism, in practice, has ontological consequences! Namely, through eschewing the ineffable, one automatically only allows a subset of all [conceptually/philosophically] possible ontologies: those that are narrowed around that which is currently speakable, and thus narrowed around that which is part of currently mainstream/dominant ideology/language, ontologies that conform to [current] reality.

*note: I am using ‘reality’ as a particular.  For the reasons listed in this note, I primarily see reality as a particular, but, to be complete, and to already move towards a next step in this dialectic, I am open to there being 2 types of reality: particular and total. I.e. maybe totality is itself a reality, the extreme/limit case of reality.